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Abstract
Background: A large part of the long-term care is provided by non-professional caregivers, generally without any
monetary payment but a value economic of time invested. The economic relevance of informal caregivers has
been recognized in Spain; however, public provision may still be scarce. The objective of this paper is to estimate
the economic burden associated with informal long-term care that should assume the families through a new
concept of cost sharing that consider opportunity costs of time provided by informal caregivers.
Methods: The study sample includes all dependent adults in Spain. Socioeconomic information and the number of
hours of informal care was collected through the Spanish Disability and Dependency Survey. The terms of shadow
and extended shadow cost sharing were defined as the difference between the maximum potential amount of
money that families could receive for the provision of informal care and the amount that actually they received and
the value of informal care time with respect to the amount received, respectively.
Results: 53.87% of dependent persons received an economic benefit associated to informal care. The average
weekly hours of care were 71.59 (92.62 without time restrictions). Shadow cost sharing amounted to, on average,
two thirds, whereas the State financed the remaining third. In terms of extended shadow cost sharing, the State
financed between 3% and 10% of informal care provided by caregivers.
Conclusions: This study reveals the deficient support received for the provision of informal care in Spain. More
than 90% of informal care time is not covered by the economic benefits that families receive from the State.
Keywords: Informal care, Economic value, Long-term care, Spain
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Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) services are those services re-
quired by individuals who are unable to perform basic
daily routines over a long time period [1]. In this sense,
LTC service providers are faced with the challenge of
providing personal care in the context of an aging popu-
lation and increasingly changing social structure.
There is an evident difference in the number of LTC
dependents in each country, ranging from less than 5%
of the 65- to 74-year-old population in high-income
countries to 50% in low- and middle-income countries
[1, 2]. However, it has been estimated that, in high-
income countries, the demand for LTC services among
people of 80 years old and older will increase from 4% in
2010 to 10% in 2050 [1].
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Currently, there are different models of LTC systems
throughout Europe, with overall spending varying as a
percentage of gross domestic product, coverage condi-
tions, LTC baskets, financing sources (general taxes,
social security contributions, private insurance, co-
payments and direct payments for services) and the
weight and relevance of informal care to total personal
care [3].
In 2007, a new System for the Promotion of Personal
Autonomy and Assistance for Persons in a Situation of
Dependency (SAAD) was established in Spain through
the approval of Act 39/2006 of 14 December (the De-
pendency Act, DA) [4], in order to attend to those
people who are dependent on help with basic activities
of the daily living. The DA acknowledged Spanish citi-
zens’ universal entitlement to social services (eligibility
being determined based on the level of dependency).
This represented a large-scale structural change in the
organization of LTC in Spain [5]. Although the DA was
initially proposed as a normative change that would in-
crease the provision of in-kind services (residential care,
day/night care or home-help services), and would only
consider the provision of economic benefits for informal
care [6], the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent eco-
nomic recession severely impacted the newly developed
SAAD. First, the economic benefits for informal care be-
came the primary benefit of the system. Undoubtedly,
this was favoured given the lower associated cost per
user compared to in-kind services. Second, in 2012,
Spain faced a complex financial and economic crisis [7].
Thus, structural reform of the DA was enacted [8, 9],
despite the previous reforms applied in 2010 [5, 10].
Among the major changes were a considerable reduction
in cash benefits allocated to informal care, limits placed
on qualifying conditions to access care and the re-
nouncement of social contributions paid to informal
caregivers by the State [11, 12].
Usually, co-payment is defined as a situation in which
the cost of providing a service is shared between the user
and the financing entity (usually the public or private in-
surer [13]). However, in the case of long-term care, a
large part of them, according to some authors, up to
80% [14], is provided by non-professional caregivers,
where there is no monetary payments but a value eco-
nomic of time invested.
Much of the literature focuses on the effect of cost-
sharing and out-of-pocket (OOP) payments in the ac-
cessibility of health care services. In some ways, cost
sharing reduces the moral hazard in the consumption
of unnecessary health care services. Unfortunately,
cost sharing also deteriorates access to essential
health care and adherence treatments, which in turn
may lead to worse health outcomes and similar or
higher health care costs [15–19].
One of the major concerns is the catastrophic financial
risk incurred by households. Studies performed in differ-
ent countries have explored the incidence of cata-
strophic risk resulting from OOP health care payments,
which include cost sharing, spending as a whole. Most
studies have focused on Asian (Vietnam [20, 21], the
Western Balkans [22], Mongolia [23], Nepal [24], Iran
[25], Thailand [26], Turkey [27] and China [28]) and Af-
rican (the Middle East and North Africa [29] and Kenya
[30]) countries. However, there are also studies from
Latin America [31] and Brazil [32], as well as two recent
studies conducted in Portugal [33] and Greece [34].
OOP payments have also been studied for specific sub-
samples, such as care for the chronically ill [35, 36] and
disabled persons [37–39]. A recent systematic review
concluded that when formal fees are introduced, protec-
tion against catastrophic health care payments is needed
for the most vulnerable groups [40]; however, to our
knowledge, no study has focused on payments allocated
to long-term care services.
The objective of this study is to analyse the economic
contribution and estimate the real economic burden of
the dependent household that received informal care as-
sociated with LTC provided in Spain. To accomplish
this, we adopt a double definition of cost-sharing,
shadow cost sharing and extended shadow cost sharing
(euros of 2017), exploring the differences depending on
the level of dependence of the individual receiving care
and the amount of time that care is provided.
Materials and methods
Data
We drew upon the Spanish Disability and Dependency
Survey (SDDS) conducted by the Spanish National Sta-
tistics Institute [41]. This is the most recent representa-
tive survey of the disabled population living in Spanish
households and includes information regarding the char-
acteristics of personal care (i.e., number of care hours)
and a household’s socio-demographic characteristics.
The survey includes a total of 22,795 individuals with
disabilities, representing 3.79 million people in popula-
tion terms by means of elevation factors.
According to the study objectives, we selected people
with dependency level I, II and III (n = 6523), older than
18 years old who received at least 1 h of informal care
per week and had a reported household income (n = 360
no reported income), accounting for approximately one
fifth of the original sample (n = 4794). The rest of the
sample is people with disability, but they did not get the
minimum score to be considered as person with at least
mild level of dependency (level I) [42]. The DA defines
three levels of dependency according to the level of se-
verity: mild (level I), moderate (level II) and severe (level
III) (see point 2.3). Inferences about the population from
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the sample results were made from population weights
provided by the survey itself [43].
Variables
Cost-sharing
The information regarding the costs of each dependency
service and the amounts of money offered for the infor-
mal care by the public system were established in the
structural reform of the 2012 DA which remain un-
changed to date [8].
Specifically, the economic benefit provided by the
State for informal care consists of a monthly allowance,
adjusted by level of dependency, issued to the dependent
person to be used to compensate the informal caregiver.
This benefit is conditioned on compliance with certain
restrictions that dependent person and informal care-
giver must to be met and that we can find in the DA [8].
For example, once of the most important could be that
the informal caregiver can only be the spouse and their
relatives by consanguinity, affinity or adoption, up to the
third degree of kinship, when they live together and
dependent person is cared by them for at least 1 year be-
fore to the date of presentation of the application.
Several reduction factors are applied to the maximum
amounts, which depend on the economic capacity of the
beneficiary (composed of employment and self-
employment income, capital income and wealth) and
their level of dependence; thus, the final amount that the
individual receives from the State is the cash benefit for
informal care (CBIC). We have defined shadow cost
sharing as the difference between the maximum amount
that dependent person could receive, depending on their
dependence level, and the amount of money that re-
ceives (CBIC). Additional file 1 describes the estimation
of shadow cost sharing.
We define extended shadow cost sharing as the total
amount of benefit that the caregiver should receive if all
the time allotted to care was valued appropriately, calcu-
lated by subtracting the amount actually received
(CBIC). Thus, the concept of extended shadow cost
sharing factors the opportunity cost of caregiver’s time.
The time spent providing informal care is obtained
from the recall method, i.e., questions collected in the
SDDS. The recall method allows to measure the time
dedicated to informal care when it is assumed that de-
pendents take into account join production when they
complete the questionnaire (for example, having a nap
or watching TV and supervising after a care recipient
with Alzheimer disease). Otherwise, the recall method
will overestimate the time spent providing informal care
[44, 45]. As we don’t know if survey respondents have
taken into account the join production, a conservative
approach was adopted for the primary analysis, and care
provided was limited to a maximum of 16 h per day
[46]. However, in the sensitivity analysis, that restriction
was eliminated.
Several techniques are applied in the literature for
valuing informal care time [45, 47, 48] highlighting the
revealed preference methods and stated preference
methods, among others. The difference between revealed
and stated preference methods is mainly explained by
the fact that the former uses responder’s preferences for
nonmarket goods. The first method uses real life deci-
sion data, that is, the preferences are taken from infor-
mal caregivers’ decisions or from close substitutes in the
market. Within stated preference methods, contingent
valuation and conjoint analysis methods are included.
However, the revealed preference methods are based on
data from real choices that people decide. Two different
approaches are included in this method; the opportunity
cost and proxy good method.
The opportunity cost method (OCM) was used for the
main analysis to value monetary assessment of care time.
This approach values informal care as the informal care-
giver’s foregone benefit as a result of time spent provid-
ing informal care [45]. This method values the best
alternatives that caregivers had to resign in order to pro-
vide the care. Following the methodology applied in
other works [49, 50], caregivers were considered to in-
vest their time in paid work, non-paid work (such as
housekeeping or voluntary work) and leisure time. Given
that in Spain, there are no recent estimations of the
value associated with leisure time, in practical terms leis-
ure and non-paid work time are valued using the same
shadow price [51]. To estimate the value of informal
care time, three groups were considered based on the in-
formation provided by each caregiver.
– Group 1 consists of those caregivers who were
forced to leave their jobs to provide care services.
Given the lack of available information regarding
weekly work hours by caregivers before leaving the
work force, full-time work was assumed (37.5 h/
week). Care time was valued according to the aver-
age full-time wage per hour in Spain in 2017 disag-
gregated by regions [52]. The additional hours
dedicated to informal care were valued at the mini-
mum salary of a household employee in Spain in
2017, which was €4.42/h [53].
– Group 2 consists of those workers who reduced
their working hours. Given the lack of information
available and following the methods of other
authors, it was assumed that the caregivers worked a
total of 37.5 h/week, requiring a reduction of three
working hours per day to provide care services [54].
The economic valuation of informal care hours,
labour time reduced and additional time, was
calculated as in Group 1.
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– Group 3 consists of those caregivers who stated that
they were not in the workforce or that they were
not having problems balancing work with care. The
time spent providing care in this case was valued
using the minimum wage of a household employee
in Spain in 2017 (€4.42/h) [53].
As part of the sensitivity analysis, two other valuation
methods were used. First, the proxy good method
(PGM) was used. PGM is a revealed preference method
which assesses the time dedicated to informal care at the
market price of the nearest substitute benefit [45]. This
technique values the care provided considering how
much it would cost to society or the family members if
informal caregivers would disappear and, consequently,
they had to be replaced at the labour market by a close
substitute. To accomplish this, the cost of in-home ser-
vice in Spain was used, calculated according to the
workload and specific prices published by each commu-
nity in 2016 and updated to 2017 [55]. Likewise, the
contingent valuation method (CVM), which is the most
commonly used stated preference method, was used.
This approach evaluates the time of caregiving taking
into consideration the caregivers’ well-being in a money
metric, with compensation variation and equivalent vari-
ation for estimating the willingness to pay (WTP) and
willingness to accept (WTA) for a hypothetical caregiv-
ing situation. WTP consists in estimating how much the
responders are willing to pay at maximum in order to
reduce 1 h of caregiving. Likewise, WTA consists in esti-
mating how much the responders are willing to accept
(to be compensated) at minimum in order to increase in
one extra hour of care. To accomplish this, the monetary
value of €6/h was used for WTA and the value of €3/h
for WTP for 1 h of extra care [56]: both prices were up-
dated to euros of 2017.
Therefore, four techniques have been used in this
study (opportunity cost, proxy good, WTP and WTA) to
assess the monetary value of the time of informal care.
Other techniques, such as conjoint analysis or wellbeing
method [57–59], have been excluded because there are
no recent estimations regarding the time of informal
care in Spain using these methods.
It is important to note that when the SAAD resolves
that a person has the right to receive a benefit, according
to the degree of dependence with which he has been
classified, they can choose between receiving an in-kind
service or an economic benefit. Shadow and extended
shadow cost sharing were estimated by weighting the
probability that the beneficiary would choose the eco-
nomic benefit associated to informal care based on the
existing statistical information by region and level of de-
pendency [10] provided in previous studies [12, 60] (see
Table A1 in Additional file 1).
Dependency level
Dependent individuals are classified in one of the three
levels of dependency defined by the DA according to the
final sum of the value obtained from an official scale
published in the Spanish Official Bulletin [42]: 0–24
points, no dependence; 25–49 points, level I or mild
level; 50–74 points, level II or moderate level; and 75–
100 points, level III or severe level. The official scale
considers 47 daily tasks (eating and drinking, control of
physical needs, bathing and hygiene, other physical care,
dressing and undressing, maintaining one’s health, mo-
bility, moving inside the home, moving outside the home
and housework). The final score is the sum of the values
of the tasks multiplied by the degree of the supervision
required and the weight assigned to that activity. Al-
though the survey used does not contain this official
scale, the large number of questions included allows us
to approximate the level of dependence as defined by
the DA [50, 51].
Scenarios of income
Original household income was categorized as follows:
less than €500; €500–999; €1000–1499; €1500–1999;
€2000–2499; €2500–2999; €3000–4999; €5000–6999;
€7000–8999; and more than €9000. However, because
the range is considerable in some categories, three eco-
nomic capacity scenarios for the beneficiary were gener-
ated: in the first scenario, mark class were used (middle
scenario), and in the second and third scenarios, as a
sensitivity analysis, the lower end of the range (mini-
mum scenario) and the upper end of the range (max-
imum scenario) were used, respectively.
The monthly household income of the beneficiaries
was valued at 2017 euros using the consumer price
index of Spain as an update factor [61].
All analyses were performed using STATA 13.0 statis-
tical software (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX).
Results
Tables A2 and A3 (Additional file 1) show the socio-
demographic information of the dependent individuals
in Spain who received at least 1 h of informal care
(population-wise) and of the informal caregivers, re-
spectively. An estimated total of 757,192 individuals are
dependent, of which 30.70% are considered to have level
I (mild) dependence; 40.38% have level II (moderate) de-
pendence; and 28.92% have level III (severe) dependence.
The dependent population has an average age of 74.46
years (standard deviation, SD: 17.30); they are predomin-
antly females (66.3%), widowed (43.1%) and married
(40.3%), with an incomplete basic education (illiterate or
primary school incomplete) (62.5%), and retired (receiv-
ing earnings-related pension) (86.2%). The average
monthly income is €1468.76 (SD: €1040.05).
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Regarding the prevailing characteristics of caregivers,
Table A2 shows they have an average age of 53.71 years
old (SD: 13.17) and majority of them are women (73.3%)
who are married (68.97%). Caregivers are characterized
as having at least a basic education (37.43%), and their
occupations are equally distributed between being a
housewife (31.37%), retired (29.61%) and employed
(27.16%). Note that 82.73% of caregivers reside in the
home of the dependent person.
It is estimated that of the total population eligible
to receive some type of benefit from the SAAD (de-
pending on the probability of service selected), 53.87%
choose the economic benefit associated to informal
care (Table 1). The average number of weekly hours
received for informal care, restricted to 16 h of daily
care, ranges from 57.77 (SD: 37.43) hours per week
for level I dependents to 86.07 (SD: 27.49) hours for
level III dependent care, translating to a range that
varies annually from 3003.85 (SD: 1946.16) hours for
level I to 4475.48 (SD: 1429.67) hours for level III.
Thus, the average for the three levels equals 3722.87
(SD: 1855.37) annual hours. When the 16 h daily
maximum limit for calculable care is removed, the
average values increase to 92.61 (SD: 56.86) hours per
week and 4815.82 (SD: 2956.89) hours per year.
Based on the hours of informal care received, the eco-
nomic amount granted by the State to families who
choose the economic benefit for informal care is esti-
mated. Table 2 reveals, for different income scenarios,
that the average benefit granted by the State amounts to
approximately one third of the total funding in terms of
shadow cost sharing, i.e., €1179.15 per year (ranging
from €723.82 for level I and €1645.59 for level III). How-
ever, on average, this represents only 7.28% of the an-
nual monetary value of informal extended care
(extended shadow cost sharing) and 36.66% of shadow
cost sharing. In other words, in terms of shadow cost
sharing, the beneficiary contributes an average of
€2036.99 annually (€1112.18 for level I and €3006.09 for
level III), i.e., the remaining two thirds (63.34%) of the
total benefit funding. This amount increases to €17,
596.67 per year if the opportunity cost of the caregiver
(extended shadow cost sharing) is considered, represent-
ing a financing of 92.72% of the service.
In scenario 2 (lower income range), there is evidence
of an equal distribution in terms of the shadow cost
sharing of the financial burden between the State
(49.16%) and beneficiary (50.14%), equity that otherwise
disappears in scenario 3 (upper income range), where
the contribution of State is reduced (22.63%) and in-
creases for the beneficiary (77.37%). However, in terms
of extended shadow cost sharing, the contribution of the
State ranges between 3.90% in scenario 3 and 8.54% in
scenario 2, with the beneficiary assuming more than 90%
of the cost of care.
Extended shadow cost sharing is also exhibited in
Figs. 1 and 2, and Tables A4, A5 and A6 (see Additional
file 1) where the sensitivity analysis shows the range of
results. Scenario 1 (Table A4) shows that the average an-
nual assessment of the extended shadow cost sharing
per dependent, using the OCM, increases across the
three levels when placing a limit (€23,192.05) on the
number of hours worked, with significant differences
that depend on the level of dependence (€17,815.89, €23,
389.62 and €28,252.90, for levels I, II and III, respect-
ively). PGM and WTA increase the amounts estimated
by 290% and 20% compared to the amounts estimated
using the OCM of up to €50,901.62 (€66,212.81 unre-
stricted) and €21,054.37 (€27,457.80 unrestricted) annu-
ally, respectively (scenario 1). Meanwhile, WTP reduces
the amount estimated for OCM by 44% to €9937.61
(€13,130.07 unrestricted).
Discussion
In summary, this study provides pragmatic information
on the coverage of informal care by the DA and its im-
plementation, finding that overall more than 90% of in-
formal care time is not covered by the economic benefits
that families receive from the State. This situation can
result in critical social consequences for Spanish fam-
ilies, which, when taken in the context of a significant
economic crisis, slow economic recovery and an in-
accessible labour market, can lead to severe situations of
social and financial catastrophe. In this sense, a recent
Table 1 Number of hours of informal care received by individuals with dependency needs in Spain
People who receive an
economic benefit for
informal care
Informal care hours with max. 16 h/day Informal care hours without restrictions
Weekly Annual Weekly Annual
Average (n) % Average (SD) Average (SD) Average (SD) Average (SD)
Mild 232,473 52.18 57.77 (37.43) 3003.85 (1946.16) 71.76 (56.45) 3731.64 (2935.49)
Moderate 305,736 55.96 71.74 (35.37) 3730.53 (1839.21) 92.45 (56.48) 4807.47 (2937.00)
Severe 218,983 52.75 86.07 (27.49) 4475.48 (1429.67) 114.97 (48.80) 5978.44 (2537.60)
Total 757.192 53.87 71.59 (35.68) 3722.87 (1855.37) 92.61 (56.86) 4815.82 (2956.89)
Source: own elaboration from the Spanish Disability and Dependency Survey
SD Standard Deviation
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study between 2006 and 2013 showed that multiple care
strategies have become more common and care has be-
come more externalised from the domestic domain [62],
so we cannot expect the magnitude of the impact if DA
had not been implemented in 2007. This could also sug-
gest that the spouses, the principal informal caregivers,
are receiving social service help and other workers who
previously did not receive [62].
According to the literature, there is no an optimal rela-
tionship between formal and informal care equivalent for
all people [63–65]. Different theories have analysed the
need of utilization and combination of both types of care,
formal and informal care. Supplementary Care Model pos-
tulates that most of the care is assumed by informal care,
while formal care operates temporarily and circumstanti-
ally [66–68]. However, Complementary Care Model ar-
gues that formal care emerges when needs exceed the
capabilities of informal care [67, 68]. Finally, in the Hier-
archical Compensation Model, the informal caregiver es-
tablishes a ranking of preferences of activities to carry out
(according to his availability), and formal caregiver
emerges for the rest of activities [67–69]. Nowadays, lit-
erature suggests that the ideal composition and distribu-
tion of formal and informal care should depend on the
type and severity of the limitations in the autonomy and
needs of the person, the environment and family situation,
as well as the availability of professional care resources.
Following our results, Spanish families bear a dispro-
portional weight in the care of dependent people against
the original aim of Spanish Dependency Act whose main
goal was to offer formal services as a quasi-exclusive
type of attention to dependent people. The main reason
seems to be that 4 years after implementation, some
Spanish regions became to grant eight out of ten bene-
fits as cash benefit for informal care instead of in-kind
services [70]. This means that in the coming years, pub-
lic authorities must make an important effort in terms of
providing professional services and support to family
caregivers. Likewise, it is necessary to progress in strat-
egies that coordinates in a more intense way, or even in-
tegrates, the formal and informal resources. In the case
of Spain, it is critical the revision of the Dependency
Act. The objective to be pursued would be the guarantee
the well-being of caregivers and of the carers.
On the other hand, the choice of the technique for the
assessment of informal care is not neutral, since it leads
us to a very different estimated values, as indicated in
previous studies [56]. Interestingly, while in the case of
productivity losses there has been a very intense debate
and there exists an extensive literature comparing the
two main methods used [71, 72], in the case of informal
care there is no such intense methodological discussion
[48]. This is possibly due to the fact that, firstly, the re-
searchers have focused on generating evidence that
shows the relevance of informal care in studies of the
cost of illnesses and its inclusion in economic evalua-
tions [73]. Secondly, there is a wide research path in the
field of informal care, of which the assessment of care
Table 2 Average and total annual amount of economic benefit granted by the State for economic benefit for informal care,
including the associated shadow and extended shadow cost sharing
Amount of benefit granted by the
State
Shadow cost sharing Extended shadow cost sharing (opportunity cost
method)
Average Standard Deviation Average Standard Deviation % Average Standard Deviation %
Scenario 1
Mild 723.82 682.98 1112.18 747.22 60.58 14,096.85 11,770.98 95.12
Moderate 1187.07 1139.56 2038.41 1241.60 63.20 17,863.61 11,601.59 93.77
Severe 1645.59 1655.55 3006.09 1722.98 64.62 20,695.00 10,656.21 92.63
Total 1179.15 1259.16 2036.99 1476.03 63.34 17,596.67 11,702.68 92.72
Scenario 2
Mild 976.81 813.46 859.19 814.96 46.80 13.848,32 11,729.96 93.41
Moderate 1609.61 1327.91 1615.87 1361.26 50.10 17,443.91 11.569.93 91.55
Severe 2252.92 1950.29 2398.76 1921.62 51.57 20,090.04 10,606.69 89.92
Total 1603.60 1501.60 1612.54 1538.84 50.14 17,172.51 11,634.85 91.46
Scenario 3
Mild 455.79 564.05 1380.21 710.22 75.17 14,823.24 15,889.88 97.02
Moderate 735.73 971.67 2489.75 1159.03 77.19 18,031.41 14,801.03 96.08
Severe 1001.93 1391.86 3649.75 1591.07 78.46 20,986.66 14,685.90 95.44
Total 727.86 1041.36 2488.27 1477.88 77.37 17,914.20 15,301.67 96.10
Amounts in euros of 2017; Scenario 1 take for estimations average income, scenario 2 lower income range and scenario 3 upper income range. Source: own
elaboration from the Spanish Disability and Dependency Survey
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time is only a (relevant) part [48]. And thirdly, the
method chosen depends on the availability of appropri-
ate data. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to point
out that eclecticism is relevant when choosing the valu-
ation technique. In any case, opportunity cost method
prevails in the literature [46, 73] and a growing use of
different methods is being recommended [46, 56].
The present work has several limitations. On the one
hand, assignment probabilities of dependency benefits
have been applied to estimate the amount corresponding
to shadow and extended shadow cost sharing, given the
absence of such data in the literature. Thus, a conserva-
tive perspective is maintained in the simulation because
it is assumed that all eligible persons receive economic
benefits for informal care. In fact, in the Spanish system,
since its implementation in 2007, there have been
significant lags between dependence degree ratings, the
recognition of benefit rights (where appropriate) and a
subsequent benefit allowance [74] resulting in a “de-
pendence limbo” [5]. Specifically, in 2015, 35% of the
population recognized as being dependent was entitled
to receive benefits but was in limbo and did not receive
any in kind or monetary benefit [75]. In practice, this
implies that our results are conservative, and the current
cost sharing should exceed our estimates. On the other
hand, it should be noted that the SDDS, through which
information related to socio-demographic characteristics
has been obtained, dates back to 2008, whereas the cal-
culation and “co-pay” amounts inherent to the economic
benefit for informal care correspond to the structural re-
form of DA of 2012. The difference between the 4 years
should influence the results only minimally because,
Fig. 1 Sensitivity analysis [1]. Estimated annual monetary value of the extended shadow cost sharing of the economic benefit for informal care
according to informal care assessment methods (with restriction in the number of daily hours of care). ΔC refers to percent increment from one
stage to another. Amounts in euros of 2017. Source: own elaboration from the Spanish Disability and Dependency Survey
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first, at the international and local level, the Spanish
population composing the majority of the dependent
population (> 65 years old) experienced only a very slight
increase from 2008 (2.40%) to 2012 (7.72%) [76]; second,
individuals with disabilities are a segment of the popula-
tion with changes in prevalence rates that are very slow
and insignificant over time [12], elucidated by the com-
parison between the curves of 1999 and 2008, in which
individuals with disabilities compose 6.2% and 6.5% of
the population, and those with dependency compose
4.4% and 5.1%, respectively [77]. The third limitation is
that the SDDS is a cross-sectional and not longitudinal
data survey, which hamper to observe the evolution of
informal care throughout the cycle of life of the people
(for both, dependent people and informal caregivers).
Last limitation is referred to the shadow price used to
estimate the value of informal care using the opportunity
cost approach, it is the same value for both types (leisure
time and unpaid production time). As we mentioned in
the methodological section, we used as proxy the mini-
mum wage of household employees in Spain for both
types because there is no information available regarding
the real values.
Regarding to the “dependence limbo”, there is a sec-
ond aspect of unmet needs for the informal care of indi-
viduals with disabilities who do not attain level I
dependency. This study reveals that these individuals re-
quire a weekly average of 44 h of informal care, being in
line with other researches carried out in the United
States and Germany that reported around 50 h per week
[78, 79]. The families of those individuals who are not
eligible to receive benefits assume the total extended
shadow cost sharing. In addition, our results support the
overburden of the informal caregiver when the severity
Fig. 2 Sensitivity analysis [2]. Estimated annual monetary value of the extended shadow cost sharing of the economic benefit for informal care
according to informal care assessment methods (without restriction in the number of daily hours of care). ΔC refers to percent increment from
one stage to another. Amounts in euros of 2017. Source: own elaboration from the Spanish Disability and Dependency Survey
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of the disease increases [51, 80], such as dementia [81],
Alzheimer’s disease [82] or cancer [83, 84].
It should also be noted that our analysis does not con-
sider other private expenses related to the care of depen-
dents [85] (transport, adaptation of the home,
professional care contracted by the family, etc.) or the
medium- and long-term repercussions of other social
opportunity costs (spillover effects) that are beyond the
scope of our analysis. Thus, it should be emphasized that
regardless of the method followed, the estimated monet-
ary figures reflect the large amount of time spent by in-
formal caregivers to care for dependents. This can
translate into an immense burden for the caregivers,
with important consequences to their health, work rela-
tionships and household finances [68]. Furthermore, al-
though most studies tend to focus on the negative
aspects of informal caregiving, there are other studies
that show that caregiving can be a positive experience
for the carer [48, 86–89], particularly in terms of psy-
chosocial effects related to personal well-being and satis-
faction with caring for another person [90–92]. In fact,
the study of multidimensional factors that influence
caregiver burden and satisfaction is a rising line of
research.
Conclusions
Despite the development of professional LTC pro-
grammes, informal care is a fundamental pillar in the
care provided to individuals with limited autonomy. Al-
though more prevalent in some countries than others
for historical and cultural reasons, the existence of infor-
mal care is evident in any European LTC programme
[93–95]. To date, informal care has been an “invisible”
resource [96], and the support that these caregivers pro-
vide their families has been insufficiently recognized so-
cially and economically, despite the significant burden
and impact on the daily life of the caregiver and their
quality of life related to health [48, 97]. However, the
demographic and social changes that we are experien-
cing are modifying the social perception towards this re-
source of extraordinary value. Long-term care systems in
Europe are moving towards mixed models, where re-
sponsibility for care is shared between the State and
families [94]. More active policies of supporting carers
(cash for care schemes and cash benefits, training, carers
assessments and legislation) are growing in Europe tak-
ing us to a transition scenario that points to a profes-
sional or at least a formalization of informal care [98].
However, this process is occurring at different speeds
across countries.
Several studies have focused on analysing the value of
informal care provided to individuals with different dis-
eases or varying levels of dependency, identifying the
amount of informal care required to serve individuals
with neurodegenerative, mental, cardio, cerebrovascular
and rare diseases, among others [46, 99]. However, to
our knowledge, none of these studies estimated the cor-
responding co-payment exclusively for the economic
benefit designed for informal care, and an extended co-
payment version has not been included based on the
principle of the opportunity cost of time spent [45, 100–
102]. Even in countries where cash benefits exist for the
provision of informal care, such as in Germany, France
and Sweden [94], any information about the benefit
amounts or co-payments are not provided. The most ap-
proximate studies are focused on health expenditures for
individuals with chronic diseases [35, 36] or disabilities
[37–39]. The literature states that the annual OOP
health care payments (including emergency, inpatient,
outpatient and prescription drugs payments) for house-
holds with disabled members (those who most need
LTC) is $1465 US or 1.29 times higher than households
without disabled members. There is also a higher cata-
strophic incidence in individuals with a severe level of
disability than moderate level [38] or $510 US for elderly
households with chronic disease patients [37]. Both
values translate to catastrophic rates (when OOP pay-
ments exceed a threshold – 40% is most common – or a
certain percentage of income minus food expenditure
[20, 103], which equal ratios of 11.5% for disabled per-
sons and 30.57% and 22.03% for rural and urban house-
holds with chronic disease patients, respectively.
Our results show that families assume a significant
burden from the provision of informal care: two
thirds of shadow cost sharing are estimated in the
middle-income scenario. Similarly, there is an extraor-
dinary sensitivity in the results regarding economic
capacity: a percentage of shadow cost sharing exists,
which ranges from 50% (minimum-income scenario)
to 75% (maximum-income scenario). At any rate,
when economic capacity exceeds €1610 monthly, the
CBIC is zero, and shadow and extended shadow cost
sharing is 100%. However, extended shadow cost
sharing exposes the financial aspect of the provision
designed for informal care as it relates to the eco-
nomic value of the provider’s time. The CBIC covers
on average 6% of the assessed total informal care
needs (range 3.90%–8.54%). According to the OCM
and WTA, the results are very similar to each other,
with the provision covering approximately 6.5%.
However, the number of weekly hours obtained for all in-
dividuals with a dependency (71.59) aligns with the results
in Spain [104] and from a recent systematic review of infor-
mal care [46], highlighting the intense workload of southern
European countries compared to other areas in the world,
the former of which provide twice the number of care hours
of northern or central European countries, North America,
Asia, Oceania and medium and low income countries.
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Future lines of research arise from the results of the
present study. Firstly, it would be interesting to valuate
informal care differences between regions in terms of
equity (differences in costs and services supply) and ca-
tastrophism (derivate of shadow and extend shadow cost
sharing). Secondly, to assess the economic impact of the
replacement of informal care to formal care, in the case
that informal care would disappear. Thirdly, to evaluate
the opportunity cost and level of involvement of infor-
mal caregiver differentiating between a close relative or
other figure (for example, using the shadow and ex-
tended shadow cost sharing). Finally, it would be rele-
vant to analyse potential differences between rural and
urban regions, given the depopulation trend that Spain
is suffering.
Our results may be relevant for the design of social
policies that recognize and focus on the informal care of
individuals with disabilities or dependency needs. In fact,
demographics and social dynamics suggest that an im-
portant component of the informal care that is being
provided today will be unsustainable in the future and
should be replaced by professional care [64, 105, 106].
Therefore, the estimated values of the extended shadow
cost sharing not only reveal the burden borne by families
today but also represent a forecast of future demand for
professional services [64, 106–108], which will require
private or public financing and, considering the high fig-
ures of time of care, a reorganizations of professional
and informal webs of services. Thus, the development of
care policies for dependents must better coordinate
health, social (professional) and family (informal) re-
sources to achieve their efficient and equitable use that
translates into improvements in the overall wellbeing,
not only of the people receiving care but also of the
caregivers. This involves making informal care “visible”,
improving its social recognition and supporting care-
givers by providing training and administrative support,
informing them of their rights and the professional ser-
vices from which they can benefit, including respite ser-
vices and other support elements [109, 110].
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